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Abstract The advantages of cloud computing encourage
individuals and enterprises to outsource their local data
storage and computation to cloud server, however, data
security and privacy concerns seriously hinder the practi-
cability of cloud storage. Although searchable encryption
(SE) technique enables cloud server to provide fundamental
encrypted data retrieval services for data-owners, equip-
ping with a result verification mechanism is still of prime
importance in practice as semi-trusted cloud server may
return incorrect search results. Besides, single keyword
search inevitably incurs many irrelevant results which result
in waste of bandwidth and computation resources. In this
paper, we are among the first to tackle the problems of
data-owner updating and result verification simultaneously.
To this end, we devise an efficient cryptographic primitive
called as verifiable multi-keyword search over encrypted
cloud data for dynamic data-owner scheme to protect both
data confidentiality and integrity. Rigorous security anal-
ysis proves that our scheme is secure against keyword
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guessing attack (KGA) in standard model. As a further con-
tribution, the empirical experiments over real-world dataset
show that our scheme is efficient and feasible in practical
applications.
Keywords Cloud storage · Searchable encryption · Result
verification · Data-owner updating · Keyword guessing
attack
1 Introduction
As the fundamental component of cloud computing [1, 2],
cloud storage [3] offers an opportunity for considerable
number of enterprises and individuals to reduce the heavy
burden of local data computations and managements. How-
ever, a large number of sensitive data (such as financial
documents, personal emails, etc.) is now placed on the semi-
honest-but-curious cloud service provider (CSP) which may
compromise data privacy. Though encryption is a straight-
forward and efficient way to eliminate the data security and
privacy concerns against semi-trusted CSP, it makes search
over encrypted data extremely difficult. The typical solu-
tion to tackle this problem is SE technique [4, 5] which
allows data-owners to retrieve encrypted files according to
user-specified keywords. For the sake of saving bandwidth
and computing resources, SE schemes should support multi-
keyword search to avoid returning irrelevant encrypted files
in practice.
In principle, CSP should ensure data confidentiality and
integrity according to specified protocols. However, data-
owners actually move their computing tasks to the semi-
trusted cloud server which may return incorrect results to
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save computational resources or maintain its reputation.
Therefore, result verification mechanism [6] should be fur-
nished to guarantee the correctness of search results. More-
over, the computational costs of result verification should be
as small as possible in order not to cancel out the advantages
of cloud storage.
In practical situations, the search right of certain data-
owner may be shifted to other data-owner without leaking
private key, as shown in Fig. 1. More specifically, we con-
sider a scenario in which certain data-owner (Data-owner A,
for example, a doctor in charge of patient medical records)
has been revoked from trusted domain. To issue multi-
keyword search over encrypted data and gain correct search
results, new data-owner (Data-owner B, as the delegatee of
Data-owner A) enables CSP to convert a small part of orig-
inal ciphertext into another form which can be searched
by himself through proxy re-encryption technique. Besides,
he empowers a private audit server to check the correct-
ness of search results. More importantly, ciphertext updating
and result verification should not incur heavy computational
burden for resource-limited entities, especially for mobile
terminals and sensor nodes.
To tackle aforementioned problems, we extend pub-
lic audit technique [7, 8] to SE scheme, and then devise
an efficient cryptographic primitive called as Verifiable
Multi-keyword Search over Encrypted Cloud Data with
Dynamic Data-Owner (VMKDO) scheme to achieve multi-
keyword search and result verification simultaneously.
Note that the multi-keyword search (including conjunc-
tive keyword search and disconjunctive keyword search)
in our scheme just supports conjunctive keyword search.
Specifically, our main contribution can be summarized
as follows:
1) Multi-keyword search. Our scheme enables data-
owners to issue multiple keywords in a search query.
2) Result verification. With the result verification mecha-
nism, our scheme can prevent CSP from returning false
or inaccurate search results.
Cloud service provider
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Fig. 1 Scenario in proposed scheme
3) Data-owner updating. With proxy re-encryption tech-
nique our scheme can support dynamic data-owner by
updating a small part of original ciphertext.
4) Security and efficiency. The formal security analysis
proves that our scheme can resist KGA in the stan-
dard model, and experimental results over a real-world
dataset show its efficiency in practice.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 first introduces the previous work associated with
our scheme. The preliminaries are presented in Section 3,
followed by Section 4 which gives the system model, threat
model and design goals. Then Section 5 demonstrates the
concrete construction of our scheme in detail. Section 6
shows the correctness, security and performance analy-
sis. Finally, the concluding remark of this whole paper is
summarized in Section 7.
2 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, SE which enables data-
owners to securely search over ciphertext through keywords
and selectively retrieve files of interest has drawn much
attention in both industrial and academic fields. And exist-
ing SE schemes can be roughly divided into two categories,
namely symmetric SE and asymmetric SE. Since Song et al.
[9] proposed the first symmetric SE scheme and Boneh
et al. [4] presented the first asymmetric SE scheme, con-
siderable number of SE schemes enriched with various
functionalities [10–13] have been further researched.
Multi-keyword search Although subsequent SE
schemes [10, 14, 15] have enhanced the security and
improved the efficiency, these scheme are still limited
to single keyword search. To shrink the searching scope
over encrypted data and retrieve exact results quickly, SE
schemes should support multi-keyword search [11, 16–20]
instead of results intersection. As the first multi-keyword
search scheme proposed by Golle et al. [21] just supported
general queries (equality search), Boneh et al. [17] pre-
sented a more practical scheme which supported arbitrary
conjunctive queries (such as comparison query, subset
query, etc.). And Hwang et al. [18] came up with a secure
multi-keyword search scheme in the asymmetric setting
and extended it to multi-user system to admit a broad range
of applications.
Result verification search However, in practice, CSP may
execute parts of search operations and returns a fraction of
search results to save computation and bandwidth resources,
thereby leading to integrity violation. To tackle this prob-
lem, Chai et al. [6] gave the first verifiable keyword search
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scheme in symmetric setting. Aiming to overcome the
limitation in single user setting, Zheng et al. [22] and
Sun et al. [23] presented the fine-grained keyword search
schemes through utilizing attribute-based encryption [24–
26]. Whereas, the aforementioned schemes were still con-
fined to single keyword search. To overcome this defect,
Sun et al. [27] constructed a verifiable multi-keyword search
scheme over dynamic encrypted data to support file collec-
tion update (such as insertion, deletion, etc.), Miao et al.
[28] presented a verifiable multi-keyword search scheme
by removing the secure channel. Whereas, these schemes
cannot be applied in the dynamic data-owner setting.
Proxy re-encryption with keyword search In some sce-
narios, certain data-owner may be revoked from the trusted
domain or delegate his search right to delegatee (new data-
owner), while updating the whole ciphertext inevitably
incurs heavy computational burden. To the best of our
knowledge, proxy re-encryption technique [29–32] can con-
vert the original ciphertext encrypted by old data-owner into
new form that can be accessed by new data-owner. Though
Guo et al. [32] introduced the notion of searchable proxy re-
encryption scheme with a designated tester, this scheme just
supports single keyword search. Along this direction, Yang
et al. [33] demonstrated a more secure multi-keyword search
scheme in the standard model through proxy re-encryption
technique, but there still existed a limitation in this scheme
which it couldn’t guarantee the accuracy of search results.
To enrich the search functionalities over encrypted data,
our scheme can achieve aforementioned functionalities (as
illustrated in Table 1) simultaneously.
3 Preliminaries
Given a set S, the symbol s ∈R S is defined as choosing
an element s uniformly at random from the set S. Then we
simply review some cryptographic background through the
following definitions.
Table 1 Functionality comparison
Schemes MKS SRV DOU
VABKS [22] 5 3 5
ABKS-UR [23] 5 3 3
VCKS [27] 3 3 5
Re-dPEKS [32] 5 5 3
Re-dtPECK [33] 3 5 3
VMKDO 3 3 3
– “MKS”: Multi-keyword Search;
– “SRV”: Search Result Verification;
– “DOU”: Data-Owner Updating.
Definition 1 (Bilinear map) LetG1,G2 be two multiplica-
tive cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of
group G1, and e be the bilinear map G1 × G1 → G2 with
following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: Given four elements a, b ∈R G1, u, v ∈R
Z∗p, we can have e(au, bv) = e(av, bu) = e(a, b)uv .
(2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1.
(3) Computability: Given elements a, b ∈R G1, there
exits an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b).
Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption) Let
G1 be a group of order p, and g be the generator of G1. For
any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, its advan-
tage on solving the DL problem in group G1 is negligible,
which is defined as Pr[A(g, ga) = a] ≤ , where a ∈R
Z∗p.
Definition 3 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH) Problem) Let (G1,G2, p, g, e) be the bilinear
map parameters. Given the tuple (ga, gb, gc, Z), the DBDH
problem is to decide whether Z equals to e(g, g)abc or to a
random element in G2. Where a, b, c ∈R G1, Z ∈R G2.
Definition 4 (Truncated Decisional q-Augmented Bilin-
ear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (q-ABDHE) Problem)
Let (G1,G2, p, g, g′, e) be the bilinear map parameters,
where (g, g′) are both the generators of G1. Given the
tuple (g′, g′q+2, g, g1, · · · , gq, Z), the truncated decisional
q-ABDHE problem is to decide whether Z equals to
e(g′, gq+1) or an element in G2. Where gi = gai (1 ≤ i ≤
q + 1), g′q+2 = g′a
q+2
, a ∈R Z∗p, Z ∈R G2.
4 Problem formulation
Let [1, n] be a series of integer set {1, 2, ..., n}, an integer
k be the security level, and (F,W) be the file and keyword
space, respectively. Besides, search token and trapdoor will
be used interchangeably throughout this paper.
4.1 System model
The cloud storage system considered in this paper involves
three main entities (as shown in Fig. 2), namely cloud
service provider (CSP), private audit server (PAS) and data-
owner (DO). Where DO uploads ciphertext (indexes and
signatures) to CSP and can issue search queries when nec-
essary, CSP provides data storage and retrieval services for
DO, PAS is responsible for verifying the correctness of
search results. When DO wants to conduct a search query,
he needs to submit a search token to CSP, then CSP matches
it with indexes and returns the relevant encrypted files to
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Fig. 2 System model of our scheme
PAS. Once the search results pass the result verification,
PAS sends the search results to DO. Besides, DO can dele-
gate his search right to other DO without leaking private key
when he leaves or is revoked.
4.2 Threat model
In this paper, PAS is assumed to be a trusted entity and hon-
estly checks whether the search results are correct or not.
Like most of previous SE schemes, CSP is still considered to
be semi-honest-but-curious. Specifically, CSP will honestly
perform the pre-defined protocols, but it is curious to exe-
cute parts of search operations, even return forged or false
search results under various motivations. While for the DO
and his delegatee, they are both authorized entities at first.
Once DO leaves or is revoked from the trusted domain, he
cannot access the sensitive information. To enable delega-
tee to issue search queries, the original ciphertext should be
updated.
4.3 Design goals
To enable secure search over encrypted data, our scheme
should realize the following design goals.
1) Ciphertext updating. When certain DO leaves or is
revoked, our scheme should allow him to delegate his
search right to other DO without leaking secret key.
2) Multi-keyword search. To accurately locate the
required encrypted files, our scheme should enable
data-owners to issue multiple keywords search at the
same time.
3) Security goals. As the keyword set is always selected
from a small space, and the security in random ora-
cle has its own inherent problems, our scheme should
resist KGA in the standard model. Besides, result ver-
ification mechanism should be provided to ensure data
integrity.
4) Efficiency and feasibility. To gain a broad range of
applications and not incur extra computational burden
during the ciphertext updating and result verification
processes, our scheme should be efficient and feasible
in practice.
5 Proposed VMKDO scheme
In this section, we first formally present the definition of our
scheme, then give the concrete construction of our scheme.
5.1 Solution framework and security model
Our scheme is a tuple of seven algorithms including Setup,
KeyGen, ReKey, Enc, Trap, Search and Verify, and these
algorithms are presented as follows:
1) Setup(1k)→ {GP, PK, SK}: Given the security
parameter k, this deterministic algorithm outputs the
global parameters GP and the public/secret key pair
(PK, SK) of the traditional public key encryption
algorithm.
2) KeyGen(GP)→ {PKOi , SKOi , PKs, SKs}. Perform
this probabilistic algorithm to output the public/secret
key pairs {(PKOi , SKOi ), (PKs, SKs)} for certain
DOi ∈ DO and CSP, respectively. Where DO is
denoted as the authorized DO-list.
3) ReKey(SKOi , SKOj )→ {rki→j }: CSP performs the
probabilistic algorithm to generate the re-encryption
key rki→j .
4) Enc(GP, F,W,PK,PKOi , SKOi , PKs, rki→j )→
{Sigi, Ii , π}. DOi first conducts this probabilistic
algorithm to generate the signature set Sigi , index set
Ii and auxiliary information π , then he sends them to
CSP. When DOi delegates his search right to DOj ,
CSP updates the signature set and a small part of index
set through re-encryption key rki→j .
5) Trap(GP, SKOi ,W ′, L)→ {T }: DOi first runs this
probabilistic algorithm to generate the search token T
for queried keyword set W ′, then he sends T and the
location set L to CSP.
6) Search(GP, T , L, Ii, SKs)→ {C′, ID′}: According
to the queried location set L, CSP issues this determin-
istic algorithm to return relevant encrypted file set C′
and corresponding identity set ID′ to PAS if and only
if the search token T matches with the index set Ii .
7) Verify(GP, PKOi , C′, ID′)→ {0, 1}: PAS runs this
algorithm to check the correctness of search results C′
through initiating interactions with CSP. If C′ passes
the result verification, PAS returns it to DOi . Other-
wise, it aborts the results. Where “0” means that C′ is
incorrect, “1” means that C′ is correct.
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As the size of keyword space W is limit, most of previ-
ous SE schemes cannot resist dictionary attack and off-line
keyword guessing attack. To this end, we utilize a desig-
nated tester [34–36] to issue test algorithm to avoid key-
word guessing attack. Like the Re-dPEKS scheme [32], our
scheme considers the adversary A to be either a malicious
CSP or DO in Game 1 and Game 2, respectively.
Definition 5 (Security model) Let an integer k be the secu-
rity parameter andA be a polynomial-time attacker, then we
show the Game 1, Game 2 between A and simulator B in
the following.
First, we assume thatA is a malicious CSP, then we show
the Game 1 as follows:
– Init: B first calls Setup and KeyGen algorithms
to output the global parameters GP , public/secret
key pairs {(PKOi , SKOi ), (PKs, SKs)} for certain
DOi and CSP, respectively. Then he sends the tuple
{GP, PKOi , PKs, SKs} to A.
– Search token queries 1: A adaptively issues a
number of search queries for distinct keyword set
{W ′1, · · · ,W ′q} to the trapdoor generation oracle:
1) Trap oracle: B first runs Trap algorithm to
generate the search tokens {TW ′i }(1 ≤ i ≤ q),
then he sends them to A.
– Challenge: A first submits two target keyword sets
(W ∗0 ,W ∗1 ) to be challenged on, then B selects a random
bit b ∈ {0, 1} and issues the Enc algorithm to generate
the target ciphertex I ∗b . Finally, he sends it to A.
– Search token queries 2: A issues a number of search
token queries as in Search token queries 1, the only
restriction is that the two keyword sets (W ∗0 ,W ∗1 ) can-
not be queried to Trap oracle.
– Guess: A returns a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins this
game if b′ = b.
The A’s advantage in breaking Game 1 is defined as
AdvGame 1A (1
k) = 2Pr[b′ = b] − 1.
Second, letA be an outside attacker (such as the revoked
DO), and we show the Game 2 as follows:
– Init: B first outputs the global parameters GP , pub-
lic/secret key pairs {(PKOi , SKOi ), (PKs, SKs)}, for
certain DOi and CSP, respectively. Then he sends the
tuple {GP, PKOi , PKs, SKs} to A.
– Challenge: A first outputs two target keyword sets
(W ∗0 ,W ∗1 ) to be challenged on. Once gaining this, then
B chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and calls the Enc
algorithm to create a target index I ∗b . Finally he sends it
to A.
– Guess: A outputs his guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins this
game on the condition that b′ = b.
Table 2 Notation descriptions
Notations Descriptions
F = {f1, · · · , fn} File set
ID = {id1, · · · , idn} Identity set
C = {c1, · · · , cn} Ciphertext set
Sigi = {sigi,1, · · · , sigi,n} DOi ’ signature set
W = {w1, · · · , wm} Keyword set
Ii = {Ii,1, · · · , Ii,n} DOi ’ index set
π = {π0, π1, π2} Auxiliary information
W ′ = {w′1, · · · , w′l} Queried keyword set
L = {L1, · · · , Ll} Location set of W ′ in W
T = {T1, T2} Trapdoor for W ′
C′ = {c′1, · · · , c′d } Search results
ID′ = {id ′1, · · · , id ′d } Returned identity set
{r, τr }(1 ≤ r ≤ d) Challenging information
(η, σ ) Proof information
The A’s advantage in breaking Game 2 is defined as
AdvGame 2A (1
k) = 2Pr[b′ = b] − 1.
Then we say that our scheme is secure against KGA
in Game 1 and Game 2 when our scheme’s advantage
AdvKGAA,VMKDO(1
k) = AdvGame iA (1k) (i ∈ {1, 2} in resist-
ing KGA is negligible.
5.2 Concrete construction
Before giving the specific construction of our scheme, we
summarize some notations used in this paper in Table 2. In
this system, as the files are encrypted by the traditional pub-
lic key encryption algorithm, which is beyond the scope of
our discussion. Thus the following algorithms mainly focus
on building index and generating signatures on encrypted
files.
Setup(1k) On input the security parameter k, this deter-
ministic algorithm first outputs the bilinear map parameters
(G1,G2, e, p, g1, g2), where G1,G2 are two groups of
order p, e : G1 × G1 → G2 is the bilinear map, and g1, g2
are two generators of G1. Then it selects two hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ →R G1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ →R Z∗p and returns the
public/secret key pair (PK, SK) of public key encryption
algorithm. Finally, it publishes the global parameters GP
through Eq. 1, where PK is used to encrypt files, and SK
shared among authorized DOs can decrypt encrypted files.
GP = {G1,G2, e, p, g1, g2, H1, H2, PK}. (1)
KeyGen(GP,DO) Assume DO be the authorized DO
set. For each DOi ∈ DO, this probabilistic algorithm first
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selects two elements bi ∈R Z∗p, βi ∈R G1 and com-
putes Bi = gbi1 . For CSP, this algorithm then chooses two
elements a ∈R Z∗p, α ∈R G1 and computes A = ga1 .
Finally this algorithm defines the the public/secret key pairs
(PKOi , SKOi ), (PKs, SKs) of DOi and CSP by Eq. 2,
respectively.
PKOi = (Bi, βi), SKOi = bi;
PKs = (A, α), SKs = a. (2)
ReKey(SKOi = bi, SKOj = bj ) When DOi leaves
and delegates his search right to DOj , CSP first selects an
element ε ∈R Z∗p and sends it to DOi . Then DOi com-
putes ε/bi and sends it to DOj , and DOj returns bj ε/bi to
CSP. Finally CSP generates the re-encryption key rki→j =
bj /bi .
Enc(GP, F,W,PK,PKOi , SKOi , PKs, rki→j ) The
DOi runs this probabilistic algorithm to generate the sig-
natures and indexes for file set F according to keyword set
W , which is shown in Fig. 3.
– Step 1: Given the file set F , this algorithm encrypts it
as C through the traditional public key encryption algo-
rithm. For each encrypted file cs ∈ C(1 ≤ s ≤ n) with
identity ids , DOi generates the signature sigi,s through
Eq. 3
sigi,s = (H1(ids)gH2(cs )2 )bi . (3)
– Step 2: Given the keyword set W , DOi builds index
for each file fs ∈ F . He first chooses two elements
λ,μ ∈R Z∗p, then he computes π0 = gλ1 , π1 =
ν · e(g1, g1)μ, π2 = e(g1, βi)μ and sets the index Ii,s
through Eq. 4, where ν = e(A, α)λ.
Ii,s = {I0, It }(1 ≤ t ≤ m), I0 = Bμi , It = g−wtμ1 . (4)
Fig. 3 Process of Enc algorithm
– Step 3: Finally, DOi sends the signature set Sigi ,
encrypted index set Ii and auxiliary information π to
CSP, where Sigi, Ii , π are defined by Eq. 5.
Sigi = {sigi,1, · · · , sigi,n},
Ii = {Ii,1, · · · , Ii,n}, π = {π0, π1, π2}. (5)
– Step 4: When DOi leaves and delegates search right
to DOj , CSP just needs to update the signatures and a
small part of indexes through Eq. 6, where 1 ≤ s ≤
n, 1 ≤ t ≤ m.
sigj,s = sigrki→ji,s = (H1(ids)gH2(cs )2 )bi ;
Ij,s = {I ′0, I ′t }, I ′0 = I
rki→j
0 = Bμj , I ′t = It .
(6)
Trap(GP, SKOi ,W ′,L) DOi runs this probabilistic
algorithm to generate search token for queried keyword set
W ′ = {w′1, · · · , w′l}. He first selects an element T1 = θ ∈R
Z∗p and sets T1 = θ , then he computes T2 through Eq. 7.
T2 = (βig−θ1 )1/(bi−
∑l
k=1 w′k). (7)
Finally he sends the search token T = {T1, T2} and the
location set L = {L1, · · · , Ll} of W ′ to CSP, where Lk(1 ≤
k ≤ l) is denoted as the location of keyword w′k in keyword
set W .
Search(GP, T ,L, Ii, SKs) Once receiving the search
token T and location set L, CSP first computes ν′ =
e(π0, α)
a , then he matches the trapdoor with index set Ii to
verify whether Eq. 8 holds or not.
e(I0 · ∏lk=1 ILk , T2)πT11 = π2 · ν′T1 . (8)
If Eq. 8 holds, then CSP outputs the relevant encrypted
file set C′ = {c′1, · · · , c′d}(1 ≤ r ≤ d) and the correspond-
ing identity set ID′ = {id ′1, · · · , id ′d} to PAS. Otherwise, it
returns ⊥.
Verify(GP, PKOi , C′, ID′) After gaining the search
results C′, PAS checks the accuracy of search results
through the following steps:
– Step 1: PAS first chooses elements τr ∈R Z∗p(1 ≤ r ≤
d) and sends challenging information {r, τr}(1 ≤ r ≤
d) to CSP.
– Step 2: Then CSP computes the proof information
(η, σ ) through Eq. 9 and sends it to PAS, where sigi,r =
(H1(id
′
r )g
H2(c
′
r )
2 )
bi .
η = ∑dr=1 τrH2(c′r ), σ =
∏d
r=1 sig
τr
i,r . (9)
– Step 3: Finally PAS verifies whether Eq. 10 holds or
not.
e(σ, g1) = e(∏dr=1 H1(id ′r )τr · gη2 , PKOi ). (10)
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If Eq. 10 holds, PAS sends C′ to DOi . Otherwise, he
aborts this process.
6 Analysis of VMKDO scheme
6.1 Correctness
In this section, we can illustrate the correctness of our
scheme if Eq. 8 and 10 hold.
For Eq. 8, we first have ν′ = e(π0, α)a = e(gλ1 , α)a = ν.
And if W ′ ⊆ W (or ∑lk=1 wLk =
∑l
k=1 w′k), we can first
have
e(I0 ·
l∏
k=1
ILk , T2)π
T1
1
= e(gbiμ1 · g
−μ∑lk=1 wLk
1 , (βig
−θ
1 )
1/(bi−∑lk=1 w′k))πT11
= e(gμ1 , βi)e(gμ1 , g−θ1 )(ν · e(g1, g1)μ)θ
= e(gμ1 , βi) · νθ ,
then we get
π2 · ν′T1 = e(g1, βi)μ · (e(π0, α)a)T1 = e(g1, βi)μ · νθ ,
finally we verify that Eq. 8 holds.
For Eq. 10, we can first get
e(σ, g1) = e(
d∏
r=1
sig
τr
i,r , g1)
= e(
d∏
r=1
(H1(id
′
r )g
H2(c
′
r )
2 )
biτr , g1)
= e(
d∏
r=1
H1(id
′
r )
τr · g
∑d
r=1 H2(c′r )τr
2 , g
bi
1 )
= e(
d∏
r=1
H1(id
′
r )
τr · gη2 , PKOi ),
then we can check that Eq. 10 holds. Therefore, we prove
that our scheme is correct.
6.2 Security
For security, we formally prove that our scheme is secure
against KGA in the standard model and can ensure the accu-
racy of search results. And its security can be guaranteed by
the following theorems.
Theorem 1 Our VMKDO scheme is secure against KGA
in the standard model on the condition that the truncated
decisional q-ABDHE problem and DBDH problem are
intractable.
Proof In Game 1, our scheme is secure against KGA in
the standard model on the condition that the truncated deci-
sional q-ABDHE problem is intractable. As the security
proof in Game 1 is similar to the scheme [32, 37], we omit it
and just show the detailed security proof in Game 2. Specif-
ically, our scheme can resist KGA assuming that DBDH
problem is intractable.
Assume thatA is a polynomial-time adversary which can
attack our scheme in Game 2 in the standard model, and B
is a simulator which can play the DBDH game.
Given a tuple (g1, gx1 , g
y
1 , g
z
1, Z) as the instance for
DBDH problem,A’s goal is to decide whether Z is equal to
e(g1, g1)
xyz or to an element in RG2. Then we present the
game between A and B as follows:
1) Init: B first sets the CSP’s public/secret key pair as
PKs = (A, α), SKs = x, where A = gx1 , α = gy1 ,
then he selects two elements βi ∈R G1, bi ∈R Z∗p
and defines certain DOi’s public/secret key pair as
PKOi = (Bi, βi), SKOi = bi . Finally, he sends the
tuple (PKs, PKOi , SKOi ) to A.
2) Challenge: A first submits two target keyword sets
(W ∗0 ,W ∗1 ), then B selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and generates the target index I ∗i,b for target key-
word set W ∗b . B chooses an element μ∗ ∈R Z∗p
and sets ν∗ = Z,π∗0 = gz1, π∗1 = Z ·
e(g1, g1)
μ∗ , π∗2 = e(g1, βi)μ
∗
, I ∗0 = Bμ
∗
i , I
∗
t =
g
−wtμ∗
1 (1 ≤ t ≤ m). Finally, B returns the tuple
(π∗0 , π∗1 , π∗2 , I ∗0 , {I ∗t }1≤t≤m) to A.
3) Guess:A needs to return a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. If b′ =
b, then B outputs “1” which means that the equation
Z = e(g1, g1)xyz hold. Otherwise, B returns “0” which
means that Z is an element in RG2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 It is computationally infeasible to generate the
valid proof information to pass the result verification for
CSP under DL assumption.
Proof If CSP can pass the result mechanism in a security
game [38] through forging a valid proof information on
incorrect search results, then we can solve the DL prob-
lem in G1 with an advantage 1 − 1p . This will contradict
to the aforementioned DL assumption as the advantage in
breaking the DL problem is negligible. Next, we present
the associated security game in detail with the following
steps:
– Step 1: PAS first sends the challenging information
{r, τr}(1 ≤ r ≤ d) to CSP, and the proof information on
correct returned results C ′ should be (η, σ ) such that it
can pass the result verification mechanism.
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Table 3 Computational
complexity in various schemes Algorithms Re-dPEKS [32] Re-dtPECK [33] VMKDO
KeyGen (2|DO| + 2)E (|DO| + 2)E (|DO| + 1)E
Enc (2m + 1)E + mP (m + 5)E + 2P (m + 5 + 2n)E + nH1 + 3P
Trap (2l + 2)E + H1 (l + 3)E 2E
Search (l + 1)E + H1 + lP (l + 4)E + (l + 2)P 2P + 3E
Verify — — (d + 1)E + dH1 + 2P
1) “DO”: Number of authorized DOs; “n”: Number of data files;
2) “m”: Number of keywords in W ; “l”: Number of queried keywords;
3) “d”: Number of search results; “—”: Not having Verify algorithm.
– Step 2: If CSP returns incorrect search results C∗
and forges a proof information (η∗, σ ), where η∗ =∑d
r=1 τrH2(c∗r ), C′ = C∗. Let η = η∗ − η = 0, if
CSP’s proof information (η∗, σ ) can pass the result ver-
ification mechanism, then CSP wins this security game.
Otherwise, it fails.
– Step 3: Assume that CSP is able to win this game,
then we get e(σ, g1) = e(∏dr=1 H1(id ′r )τr · gη
∗
2 , PKOi )
according to Eq. 10. As (η, σ ) is correct proof infor-
mation, we also get e(σ, g1) = e(∏dr=1 H1(id ′r )τr ·
g
η
2 , PKOi ). Therefore, we reach a conclusion that
g
η∗bi
2 = gbiη2 ⇔ gηbi2 = 1 according to the properties
of bilinear map. However, for two elements φ, ϕ ∈R
G1, there exists an element  ∈R Z∗p such that ϕ =
φ . Without loss of generality, gbi2 can be defined as
g
bi
2 = φρϕ ∈ G1, where ρ,  ∈R Z∗p. Finally, we have
(φρϕ)η = 1 = φρηϕη.
– Step 4: If CSP wins the game, we can solve the DL
problem. Given φ, ϕ = φ ∈R G1, the elements ϕ,
can be set as ϕ = φ(−ρη/η), = −ρη/η
unless η = 0. Whereas, we know that η = 0 and 
is an element in RZ∗p. Thus, the probability of η = 0
is 1
p
and it is negligible due to the large prime p. Based
on above rigorous analysis, we can solve the DL prob-
lem with an advantage 1− 1
p
, which will contract to the
Definition 2.
Therefore, in our scheme, CSP cannot generate the valid
proof information on incorrect search results to pass the
result verification under DL assumption, this completes the
proof of Theorem 2.
6.3 Performance
In this section, we mainly assess the performance of our
scheme in terms of theoretical performance (computational
complexity) and actual performance through exploiting the
Type A curves within the Paring Based Cryptography (PBC)
library. The experiments are implemented on an Ubuntu
15.04 Server with Intel Core i5 Processor 2.3 GHz using C
language and PBC Library. In PBC Library, the Type A is
denoted asE(Fq) : y2 = x3+x,G1 is a subgroup ofE(Fq),
and the cyclic group is a subgroup of E(Fq)2, where q is a
large prime number. The group order of G1 is 160-bit, and
the base field is 512-bit.
With respect to theoretical performance, we consider
several more time-consuming operations, such as exponen-
tiation operation (E) in G1 or G2, pairing operation (P ) and
hash operation (H1) which maps a bit string to element in
G1, then we show the computational burden of our scheme
through comparing with other analogous schemes [29, 32,
33] in Table 3.
From Table 3, we note that KeyGen, Trap, Search algo-
rithms in our scheme have less computational overhead
than those of other schemes. Although Enc algorithm in
our scheme has heavier computational burden than that of
other schemes, it does not affect the user search experi-
ence as it just one-time cost. Regarding the particular Verify
algorithm in our scheme, its computational cost is still
acceptable in practice due to the small value of d. Therefore,
our scheme is feasible in a broad range of applications as it
supports both multi-keyword search and result verification
without incurring extra computational burden.
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However, we still need to perform empirical study over a
real-world dataset, namely Enron email dataset1, to evaluate
the actual performance of our scheme. For convenience, we
first randomly choose 10,000 files (n = 10000) from this
dataset, set the number of keywords in W be 1000 (m =
1000), and then run experiments for 100 times.
In Fig. 4, the computational overhead of KeyGen algo-
rithm in all schemes almost linearly increases with the
number of DOs (In here, we set DO ∈ [1, 100]). We notice
that our scheme and Re-dtPECK scheme have approx-
imately equal computational overhead in KeyGen algo-
rithm, and these two schemes are superior to Re-dPEKS
scheme.
As our scheme needs to generate signatures and indexes
simultaneously, and both Re-dtPECK and Re-dPEKS
schemes just generate indexes, the computational burden
of Enc algorithm in our scheme is much heavier than that
of other two schemes in Fig. 5. For comparison, we set
n = 10000, thus the Enc algorithm in all schemes are
just affected by the single factor m ∈ [1, 1000] and its
computational burden becomes heavier with increasing the
value of m. Though the performance of Enc algorithm
in our scheme is inferior to that of other schemes, Enc
algorithm is just one-time cost and does not affect user
search experience. Therefore, our scheme is still acceptable
in practice.
From Fig. 6, our scheme has much less computational
cost in Trap algorithm than other two schemes. And Re-
dPEKS scheme is inferior to Re-dtPECK scheme. Besides,
the computational costs of Trap algorithm in both Re-
dtPECK and Re-dPEKS schemes are influenced by the
number of queried keywords (l ∈ [1, 100]), and become
higher with increasing l, while the computational cost of our
scheme almost remains unchanged.
In Fig. 7, both Re-dtPECK scheme and Re-dPEKS
scheme in Search algorithm have much more com-
putational overhead than our scheme. Moreover, the
computational overhead of these schemes is increased with
increasing the value of l, while that of our scheme is almost
constant.
In Fig. 8, we demonstrate the computational cost of the
unique Verify algorithm in our scheme. We notice that the
computational cost of result verification increases linearly
with the number of search results (d ∈ [1, 50]), while it is
still within acceptable limits. According to aforementioned
comparisons, the actual performance evaluation is in com-
plete accord with theoretical performance shown in Table 3.
Therefore, our scheme is efficient and feasible in a broad
range of practical applications.
1http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼enron/.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel VMKDO scheme to
support both result verification and multi-keyword search
without incurring heavy computational burden. Besides, our
scheme enables DO to issue search queries and delegate
his search right to other authorized DO. Different from pre-
vious SE schemes, our scheme holds stronger security in
resisting keyword guessing attack in the standard model.
And empirical experiments over real-world dataset indicate
its efficiency and feasibility in practice. As part of future
work, we need to explore more efficient SE scheme with
supporting expressive search.
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